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Abstract
Consider the sale of mortgages by a loan originator to a buyer. As widely noted,
such a transaction is subject to a severe adverse selection problem: the originator has
a natural information advantage and will attempt to sell only the worst mortgages.
However, a second important feature of this transaction has received much less at-
tention: both the seller and the buyer may have existing inventories of mortgages
similar to those being sold. We analyze how the presence of such inventories a⁄ects
trade. We use our model to discuss implications for regulatory intervention in illiquid
markets.
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11 Introduction
Consider the sale of mortgages by a loan originator to a buyer. As widely noted, such
a transaction is subject to a severe adverse selection problem: the originator has a
natural information advantage and will attempt to sell only the worst mortgages.1
However, a second important feature of this transaction has received much less at-
tention: both the seller and the buyer may have existing inventories of mortgages
similar to those being sold. These inventories a⁄ect trade if the buyer and/or seller
care about market perceptions of their value.
One direct way in which inventories a⁄ect decisions is if market participants are
subject to some form of market-value accounting.2 Any e⁄ect of this type is necessarily
speci￿c to a particular accounting regime. In this paper, we instead consider an
arguably more fundamental e⁄ect. When market participants trade, information is
released to the market, and market participants update their estimates of asset values.
This e⁄ect occurs ￿ independent of the accounting regime ￿ whenever traders care
about market perceptions of the total value of their portfolios. In particular, traders
may be ￿nanced by short-term debt and so need to ensure that the market valuation
of their assets exceeds that of their liabilities.
As in the standard case of trade under asymmetric information, in equilibrium the
seller only sells the worst assets, and so trade drives the market valuation of inventories
downward. One possible equilibrium response is for the parties to abandon trade ￿
the ￿freeze￿ of the title. In this case, no new information about the value of the
mortgages emerges. In contrast, if the gains from trade are bounded away from zero,
trade never completely breaks down in the standard asymmetric information model
1See, for example, Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008).
2See, for example, Adrian and Shin (forthcoming), Allen and Carletti (2008), Heaton, Lucas, and
McDonald (forthcoming), Plantin, Sapra, and Shin (2008), and Milbradt (2008).
2without inventories.
Perhaps surprisingly, however, in other circumstances inventories can have just the
opposite e⁄ect and increase the amount of trade. The reason is that an increase in
the probability of equilibrium trade makes the negative information associated with
trade less negative.
We analyze the conditions under which inventories decrease the amount of trade
and, likewise, when they increase the amount of trade. For example, we show that
the buyer￿ s inventory can increase trade when he is moderately leveraged, but if the
buyer becomes too leveraged, trade is reduced and the market breaks down. We also
extend the result to a dynamic setting, showing how changes in leverage can a⁄ect
prices and volume through time, even when there is no change in fundamentals.
We use our model to discuss implications for regulatory intervention in illiquid
markets. On the buyer side, our analysis highlights the potential role of a large investor
unencumbered by existing inventories (the government, for example). On the seller
side, our analysis suggests limitations to the standard prescription that sellers should
retain a stake in the assets they sell. It also suggests that regulatory interventions to
buy up assets may need to be large enough to buy all the seller￿ s assets.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the model, which we solve
in Section 3. We focus on three cases: A benchmark case, where neither the seller
nor the buyer has inventories of similar assets; the case in which only the seller has
inventories; and the case in which only the buyer has inventories. In Section 4, we
discuss some policy implications, and in Section 5 we extend the model to a dynamic
framework. We conclude in Section 6. The appendix contains proofs.
31.1 Some related literature
Several contemporaneous papers also explain why a market may freeze. In Diamond
and Rajan (2009) trading freezes because a seller, who may have a liquidity shock
that will force him into bankruptcy, prefers to ￿gamble￿ : If he sells now, he receives
a low price that re￿ ects a potential ￿re sale. If he waits, he can sell the asset at a
higher price, but only if he survives. In their model information is symmetric, and
in terms of e¢ ciency, it does not matter who holds the asset. Acharya, Gale, and
Yorulmazer (2009) explain why short-term borrowing may freeze even when there is no
credit risk. In their model the price of the asset falls unless some good news arrives,
but when the debt needs to be rolled over very often, the probability of receiving
good news is very low, and borrowing freezes. Easley and O￿ Hara (2008) show that
a market may freeze when traders have incomplete preferences over portfolios, and
when a trader is assumed to move away from the status quo only if he is better o⁄
for every possible belief in the set of beliefs that represent his preferences. Thompson
(2009) explores a mechanism by which asymmetric information can lead to delays in
borrowing or lending. Allen, Carletti, and Gale (forthcoming) use the term market
freeze to describe a situation where interbank trading does not occur because there
is excess liquidity and the banks facing the largest demand for liquidity can cover it
themselves; in their setting a market freeze is e¢ cient.
Milbradt (2008) studies the (dynamic) trading behavior of a ￿nancial institution
that is subject to a leverage constraint. In his paper the leverage constraint is based
on the price of the last trade (marking to market), so an institution may have the
incentive not to trade if the price is low. In our paper the capital constraint is based
on Bayes￿rule, and the market may break down even if the true value (fundamental
price) is high. Also, in his setting the price is exogenous (and becomes public only if
4the institution trades), whereas in our setting the price is endogenous.
2 The model
There is a risk neutral buyer and a risk neutral seller. The value of an asset is v to
the seller and v+￿ to the buyer, where ￿ 2 (0;1=2) denotes the gains from trade. It
is assumed (and it￿ s common knowledge) that v is drawn from a uniform distribution
on [0;1]. The seller knows v. Everyone else is uncertain about the value of v. The
assumption ￿ > 0 implies that trade is always e¢ cient. The assumption ￿ < 1=2
ensures that the bid price is always less than one.
We assume the following trading process: The buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it
o⁄er to buy q units of the asset at a price (bid) per unit b.3 The seller can either
accept or reject. If the seller accepts, the seller￿ s pro￿t is ￿s = q(b ￿ v), and the
buyer￿ s pro￿t is ￿b = q(v + ￿ ￿ b). If the seller rejects, each ends up with a zero
pro￿t. The outcome of the bargaining game is publicly observable and is denoted by
  = (q;b;￿), where ￿ denotes whether trade occurred (￿ = 1) or not (￿ = 0).
In addition to the asset discussed above, both the buyer and seller have existing
inventories of similar assets; cash; and outstanding debt liabilities. On the asset side
the buyer (i = b) and the seller (i = s) both have cash (Zi), inventories of xi units
of the traded assets (for which the gains from trade is ￿) and Mi ￿ xi units of
another asset, for which the gain from trade is zero. The values for the two assets
are correlated, and for simplicity, we assume perfect correlation; i.e., the value of the
second asset is v to both the buyer and the seller. On the liability side, each has total
liabilities Li. Without loss, we assume xb = 0 (it does not matter how buyer￿ s total
3From Samuelson (1984), this is the buyer￿ s most preferred trading mechanism in the benchmark
case in which the buyer and seller do not care about the market valuation of inventories.
5inventory Mb is split between the two perfectly correlated assets), and simply write
xs = x.
Both the buyer and the seller are subject to capital constraints, which require that
they have enough assets relative to net liabilities. The seller￿ s capital constraint is
￿sh( )(Ms ￿ ￿q) + ￿bq + Zs ￿ Ls, (1)
where ￿s is a constant satisfying ￿s 2 (0;1]; h( ) is the ￿value￿of each unit based on
the outcome of the bargaining between the buyer and the seller; Ms￿￿q is the seller￿ s
total inventory of assets net of trade; ￿bq + Zs is the seller￿ s cash, net of trade; and
Ls is the seller￿ s liabilities. The value h( ) is derived using Bayes￿rule, as explained
in the next section. If the buyer o⁄ers to buy nothing, then h( ) = 1
2, as one can
learn nothing about v.
Similar to the seller￿ s, the buyer￿ s capital constraint is
￿bh( )(Mb + ￿q) ￿ ￿bq + Zb ￿ Lb; (2)
where ￿b 2 (0;1].




￿￿s if ￿sh( )(Ms ￿ ￿q) + ￿bq ￿ Ls ￿ Zs
￿￿s ￿ Bs otherwise. (3)
The buyer￿ s utility is obtained in a similar way:
Ub =
￿
￿￿b if ￿bh( )(Mb + ￿q) ￿ ￿bq ￿ Lb ￿ Zb
￿￿b ￿ Bb otherwise. (4)
We focus on the case in which the capital constraints are satis￿ed before trading
begins. Thus, absent trade, i.e., if the buyer o⁄ers to buy nothing, the buyer and
seller each obtains a utility of zero. We also assume that Bs and Bb are su¢ ciently
6high that the buyer￿ s and seller￿ s ￿rst priority is to satisfy their capital constraints.
Speci￿cally, we assume that Bs > x and Bb > x(1 + ￿).4
Finally, we assume that
Assumption 1 x <
￿b
2￿￿bMb
This assumption ensures that if q > 0, increasing b loosens the buyer￿ s capital
constraint. (See subsection 3.3.)
3 Trade, volume, and prices
We focus on three cases: (1) The benchmark case, in which neither the buyer nor the
seller cares about the value of their inventories; (2) The case in which only the seller
cares about the value of his inventories;5 (3) The case in which only the buyer cares
about the value of his inventories.6
3.1 Benchmark case: neither buyer nor seller cares about
value of inventories
In the benchmark case, the buyer o⁄ers a pair (q;b) to maximize his expected pro￿ts
subject to q ￿ x. Since the seller accepts if and only if v ￿ b, the buyer￿ s expected
pro￿t is
￿(q;b) = q Pr(v ￿ b)E(v + ￿ ￿ bjv ￿ b): (5)
4Since ￿s ￿ x and ￿b ￿ x(1 + ￿), the assumption ensures that the disutility (Bi) from violating
the capital constraint is always larger than the potential pro￿t.
5For instance, the buyer has enough cash relative to his liabilities and the money needed to
purchase the asset. A su¢ cient condition is Zb ￿ x ￿ Lb.
6For instance, Zs ￿ Ls, so the seller￿ s capital constraint is always satis￿ed.
7Since v is uniform on [0,1], we obtain that
￿(q;b) = q￿(b); (6)
where ￿(b) ￿ b(￿ ￿ 1
2b).
The seller accepts the o⁄er with probability b. This is the ￿rst term in ￿(b).
Conditional on the seller accepting the o⁄er, the expected value of the asset is 1
2b.
Thus, the buyer ends up with an asset whose expected value to him is ￿+ 1
2b. Since
he pays b, the buyer￿ s expected net pro￿t is ￿ + 1
2b ￿ b. This is the second term in
￿(b).
The buyer￿ s pro￿t-maximizing bid is to buy everything, q = x, for a price b = ￿.
The probability of trade (b) increases when the gain from trade is higher. The gains
from trade are split equally between the buyer and seller; the seller obtains rents
because of his private information, and the buyer obtains rents because he is the one
making the o⁄er.
Proposition 1 In the benchmark case, the buyer o⁄ers to buy x units at a price per
unit ￿. The seller accepts this o⁄er if and only if v ￿ ￿.
3.2 Only seller cares about the value of his inventory
In this subsection we consider the case in which the seller cares about the value of
his inventory but the buyer does not. A necessary condition for this case is that the
seller￿ s liabilities exceed his cash, Ls > Zs. Since ￿s ￿ q ￿ x < Bs, and since
we assume that the capital constraint is initially satis￿ed, the seller accepts an o⁄er
(q;b) with q > 0 if and only if the following two conditions hold: (i) v ￿ b and (ii)
conditional on accepting the o⁄er, the capital constraint is not violated.
8When v is uniform on [0,1], we obtain from Bayes￿rule that if the seller accepts
an o⁄er with q > 0, then h( ) = 1
2b; if the seller rejects, h( ) = 1
2(1 + b). As noted
earlier, if q = 0, then h( ) = 1
2
Thus, the capital constraint becomes
1
2






where ￿s ￿ Ls￿Zs
1
2￿sMs and ￿s ￿ 2￿￿s
￿sMs. Note that ￿s is a measure of the seller￿ s initial
leverage; it measures net liabilities relative to assets. For simplicity, we omit the
subscript s for the rest of this subsection.
Holding the price b ￿xed, it is easier to satisfy the seller￿ s capital constraint when
q is higher. The reason is that the seller always pro￿ts from a trade, so replacing
assets with cash adds value to the capital constraint.7 Consequently, if the buyer
￿nds it worthwhile to bid at all, he bids for the entire quantity available, i.e., q = x:
bidding for a lower quantity not only lowers the buyer￿ s pro￿ts, but it also makes it
harder to satisfy the seller￿ s capital constraint and have him accept the o⁄er.
Lemma 1 The buyer buys everything or nothing: An o⁄er (q;b) with q 2 (0;x) that
satis￿es equation (8) is strictly dominated (from the buyer￿ s perspective) either by
(x;b) or by (0;b).
The buyer￿ s problem reduces to choosing b to maximize his pro￿ts ￿(x;b), such
that b ￿ ￿
1+￿x so that the seller￿ s capital constraint is satis￿ed. Since the buyer loses
7Formally, since ￿s 2 (0;1], it follows that ￿s > 0, and so the the right-hand side in equation (8)
is decreasing in q.
9money (i.e., ￿ (x;b) < 0) from bids b > 2￿, trade is impossible if ￿
1+￿x > 2￿. If
instead ￿
1+￿x ￿ 2￿, the buyer bids as close to his benchmark bid of ￿ as possible,
i.e., b = max(￿; ￿
1+￿x).
Proposition 2 When only the seller cares about the value of his inventory, trade can
occur if and only if ￿ ￿ 2￿(1 + ￿x). In this case, the buyer o⁄ers to buy x units at
a price per unit max(￿; ￿
1+￿x), and the seller accepts if and only if v ￿ b.
Figure 1 shows the optimal bid (which equals the probability of trade) as a function
of the seller￿ s initial leverage. An increase in leverage ￿rst increases trade but then
leads to a collapse. Intuitively, when the seller￿ s initial leverage is low, the probability
of trade is the same as in the benchmark case because the seller has enough slack
to satisfy his capital constraint even though trade reduces the perceived value of his
existing assets. When leverage increases, so that the seller has less slack, the buyer
must increase his bid to ensure that the seller￿ s capital constraint holds. Finally, if
leverage is too high, the market breaks down because any bid that is high enough to
satisfy the seller￿ s capital constraint yields negative expected pro￿ts to the buyer.
The result that leverage can increase the probability of trade depends on the fact
that the buyer has some bargaining power, so that without capital constraints the
buyer makes positive pro￿ts. This allows him to bid higher and still make positive
pro￿ts (but less than in the benchmark case) when the capital constraint is binding.
We focus on an extreme case in which the buyer has all of the bargaining power, but
the nature of the result remains even if the buyer has only some of the bargaining
power.
Figure 1 also illustrates that increasing x (the maximum amount that can be sold)
has two e⁄ects: It increases the region where the probability of trade is the same as in
the benchmark case (left region), and it reduces the region in which the market breaks
10down (right region). Intuitively, when x increases, the non-traded asset becomes a
smaller fraction of the seller￿ s balance sheet and it does not matter that its perceived
value falls. Increasing ￿ has a similar e⁄ect because when the gains from trade are
higher, the optimal benchmark bid is higher, and it is also easier to satisfy the capital
constraint without losing money. Figures 1a and 1b show the probability of trade as
a function of ￿ and x.
3.3 Only buyer cares about the value of his inventory
In this subsection we consider the case in which the buyer cares about the value of
his inventory but the seller does not. A su¢ cient condition for this case is that the
buyer￿ s liabilities exceed his cash, Lb > Zb.
We focus on the case in which h( ) is the expected value of v + ￿￿, where ￿ is a
constant satisfying ￿ 2 [0;1]. At the extreme of ￿ = 0, the buyer￿ s capital constraint
is based on the value of the asset to the seller, which could also be the value of the
asset to a potential lender. At the opposite extreme of ￿ = 1, the buyer￿ s capital
constraint is based on the value of the asset to the buyer. As before, the expected
value of v is based on Bayes￿rule. If the seller accepts an o⁄er, h( ) = 1
2b + ￿￿. If
the seller rejects an o⁄er, h( ) = 1
2(1 + b) + ￿￿.




b + ￿￿)(Mb + q) ￿ bq ￿ Lb ￿ Zb. (9)
This reduces to
b ￿ ￿bbq + cq ￿ 2￿b, (10)
where ￿b ￿
Lb￿zb
￿bMb ￿ ￿￿, ￿b ￿
2￿￿b
￿bMb, and c ￿
2￿￿
Mb . Note that
￿b+￿￿
1=2+￿￿ is the buyer￿ s
initial leverage (measured as net liabilities over value of assets), and we sometimes
refer to ￿b is ￿leverage.￿We drop the index b throughout the subsection.
11Assumption 1, which reduces to ￿x < 1, ensures that increasing the bid always
loosens the capital constraint. Increasing b increases the perceived value of existing
inventories, which helps loosen the capital constraint, but it also increases the amount
the buyer pays for the new asset, which goes against the capital constraint. When
the amount of inventories is large relative to the amount for sale, as in Assumption
1, the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates.
The buyer chooses a bid (q;b) 2 [0;x] ￿ (0;1) to maximize q￿ (b). In cases of
indi⁄erence, we assume the buyer makes the bid associated with the highest quantity
q, thereby maximizing social welfare.
Start with the special case ￿ = ￿ = 1. Since we must have b ￿ 2￿ (to ensure
the buyer does not lose money), the coe¢ cient for q in the capital constraint is
nonnegative, and as in Lemma 1, it is optimal to o⁄er either q = 0 or q = x.
Intuitively, when ￿ = ￿ = 1, the capital constraint captures the full asset value to
the buyer, and since the buyer makes nonnegative pro￿ts, buying more assets adds
value to the capital constraint. Using a logic similar to that in the seller￿ s case, the





Trade can happen only if b(x) ￿ 2￿, which reduces to ￿ ￿ ￿. If trade happens, the
buyer chooses b = max(￿;b(x)).
For other parameter values, the buyer may o⁄er to buy less than the maximum
amount. This is because buying more units increases pro￿ts, but it also tightens the
capital constraint.
Proposition 3 Consider the case in which only the buyer cares about the value of
his inventory. If ￿ = ￿ = 1, trade can happen if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿, and if trade
12happens, the buyer o⁄ers to buy x units at a price per unit max(￿;b(x)). Otherwise,
trade can happen if and only if ￿ < ￿, and there exists a number e ￿ 2 (0;￿), such that
if ￿ 2 [0;e ￿], the buyer o⁄ers to buy x units at a price per unit max(￿;b(x)); and if
￿ 2 (e ￿;￿) the buyer o⁄ers to buy q < x at a price per unit b(q), where q is the unique
solution to maxq2[0;x] q￿(b(q)). In addition, up to the point at which the market breaks
down, the amount o⁄ered is continuous and weakly decreasing in ￿, and the bid price
is continuous and weakly increasing in ￿.
If the buyer￿ s initial ￿leverage￿is low, the benchmark solution is achieved. Oth-
erwise, the buyer can increase the bid price and/or reduce the quantity to ensure
that his capital constraint is satis￿ed. Increasing the bid is e⁄ective when the buyer￿ s
inventory (M) is high, so leverage is low. In this case, it is optimal to choose q = x.
However, when the total quantity for sale, x, is high relative to M, it is optimal for
the buyer to increase the bid as well as to reduce the quantity; thus, q < x. Increas-
ing the bid without reducing the quantity may not be enough to satisfy the capital
constraint because the buyer pays more than the asset￿ s borrowing capacity. Even if
it is enough, it is suboptimal because bidding a high price for a large amount x sub-
stantially reduces pro￿ts. By reducing the quantity, the buyer can reduce the price
and also satisfy the capital constraint. Finally, if leverage is too high, so that the
buyer has only a little slack in his capital constraint, the market freezes because even
if the buyer buys just a small quantity, he must bid a high enough price to ensure
that the perceived value of his existing assets does not fall too much. But then the
buyer expects to make a negative pro￿t.
134 Policy implications
One of our model￿ s main implications is that socially e¢ cient trade can completely
break down ￿ ￿freeze￿￿ when either the buyer or the seller of an asset is both
highly leveraged and holds signi￿cant inventories of similar assets. This implication
is consistent with the ongoing ￿nancial market turmoil of the last couple of years.
Our analysis has implications for government attempts to defrost markets and for
regulatory proposals aimed at improving market functioning.
4.1 Defrosting frozen markets
Consider the case in which only the buyer cares about inventory values and in which
trade has completely broken down, i.e., ￿ ￿ ￿b (see Proposition 3).8 One option open
to a government is to o⁄er to buy the seller￿ s asset.
Formally, suppose that the government￿ s valuation of the asset is v + ￿g, where
￿g < ￿, and as before v is private information to the seller. In line with commonly
voiced concerns, a general problem with voluntary government purchase schemes is
that sellers part with only their worst assets: if the government o⁄ers to pay b, the
seller only sells if v ￿ b (the same as with a private buyer) and makes an expected
pro￿t of b2
2 .
A central question raised by government purchase schemes is whether they can
succeed without taxpayer subsidies (in expectation). Our model has two implications
in this respect.
First, observe that because of the rent the seller makes from his informational
advantage, a subsidy-free purchase scheme is possible only if the asset is worth more
8In the special case ￿ = ￿ = 1, the market breaks down if ￿ < ￿b, and we can assume below that
￿g ￿ ￿.
14to the government than to the seller, i.e., ￿g > 0.
Second, even if this demanding condition is satis￿ed, a subsidy-free purchase
scheme imposes a cost on the original potential buyer. Recall that this buyer does
not buy the asset himself because doing so violates his capital constraint. However,
the same is true when the government buys the asset at unsubsidized terms. To see
this, observe that if the purchase is unsubsidized, the market value of the asset after
trade is b
2 ￿ ￿g. Since ￿g < ￿ ￿ ￿b, it follows that the buyer￿ s capital constraint is
violated after the government purchases the asset (i.e., b < 2￿b). Moreover, note that
a similar issue arises if the government subsidizes a second private buyer to purchase
the asset.
Consequently, if either the asset is worth less to the government than to the seller,
￿g ￿ 0, or if the government wishes to avoid hurting the original buyer, then a
taxpayer subsidy is required to defrost the frozen market.
4.2 Should regulation mandate some retention of the asset
by the seller?
A commonly voiced regulatory proposal is that sellers of assets subject to asymmet-
ric information problems, such as loan originators, should be required to retain some
stake in the assets they sell.9 Our analysis identi￿es a potential cost to this proposal,
namely, that under some circumstances it leads to a market breakdown. To see this,
reinterpret the parameter x in our model as stemming from a regulation mandating
that the seller retain a fraction Ms￿x
Ms of the asset he is selling. From Proposition
2, whenever x is su¢ ciently low, trade is impossible, because the seller cares too
9See, for example, the recent New Democrat Coalition Principles for Financial Regulatory Re-
form, February 2009.
15much about the market￿ s perception of the value of the assets he is forced to retain.
Moreover, notice that this case arises more easily when the seller is highly leveraged
(measured by ￿s). And, of course, in addition to the possibility of total market break-
down, restricting the amount the seller can trade reduces the expected volume of
trade.
The goal that would-be regulators appear to have in mind with this proposal is
to reduce moral hazard on the part of asset sellers ￿ for example, to discourage
loan originators from making bad loans and/or shirking on monitoring later on. Our
analysis does not speak to this issue, and it seems likely that the proposal would have
its intended e⁄ect in this regard. Our point here is instead to draw attention to a
potentially signi￿cant cost of this proposal, namely, that it can lead to the breakdown
of socially e¢ cient trade.
5 Dynamic model
So far, we have taken traders￿leverage, and hence the tightness of their capital con-
straints, as given. In practice, both emerge endogenously from prior decisions. Ac-
cordingly, in this section we extend the single-period model from Subsection 3.3 to a
dynamic framework. We start by formulating the problem of a buyer who can trade
sequentially with n > 1 potential sellers. Then we focus on the case n = 2 and fully
characterize it. One of the main results is that changes in the buyer￿ s leverage can
a⁄ect prices and volume, even when there is no change in asset fundamentals.
165.1 n sellers
There are n types of assets, n potential sellers, and one buyer. Seller i sells asset i,
and it is assumed that he can sell at most xi units. The per unit value of asset i
is vi to the seller and vi + ￿i to the buyer, where v1;:::;vn are iid with a uniform
distribution on [0,1]. As before, it is assumed that ￿i 2 (0;1=2) for every i.
The buyer trades sequentially with the n sellers. There are at most n rounds, and
in each round, the buyer trades with a di⁄erent seller. (We sometimes refer to rounds
as periods.) At the beginning of round i, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it-o⁄er
(qi;bi) to seller i, who can either accept or reject the o⁄er. When qi = 0, we say
that the buyer did not make an o⁄er; and without loss, we assume bi = 0 in this
case. If i < n, with probability ￿, there are no more rounds (so the buyer cannot
make additional o⁄ers); with probability 1￿￿, the buyer moves on to the next round,
where he makes an o⁄er to seller i+1. Thus, the total number of rounds is min(n;N),
where N has a geometric distribution with a success probability ￿. We sometimes
denote m ￿ 1 ￿ ￿.
Before trading begins, the buyer has inventories of Mi units of asset i, i = 1;:::;n,




[￿ih( i)(Mi + ￿iqi) ￿ ￿ibiqi] ￿ L, (11)
where ￿i = 1 if seller i accepts the o⁄er, ￿i = 0 if seller i rejects, and h( i) = 1
2b+￿i￿i
is the perceived value of asset i given the trading outcome  i = (qi;bi;￿i). (Notation
is consistent with that in subsection 3.3.) Note that the perceived value of asset i
does not depend on the outcome of trade with seller j 6= i because asset values are
independent of each other.
If the capital constraint is satis￿ed, the buyer ends up with
Pmin(n;N)
i=1 ￿(qi;bi).
17Otherwise, he ends up with
Pmin(n;N)
i=1 ￿(qi;bi)￿B. The buyer￿ s problem is to choose
a sequence of o⁄ers (qi;bi)i=1;:::;n to maximize his expected utility. Each o⁄er can
depend on the history of trades, but because we assumed that sellers are independent,
the relevant information can be summarized by the perceived value of the buyer￿ s
assets before he makes an o⁄er. As before, in cases of indi⁄erence, we assume the
buyer makes the bid associated with the highest quantity q, thereby maximizing social
welfare.
We make the following parameter assumptions:
Assumption 2 ￿i = ￿i = 1
Assumption 3 xi < min(Mi;(
1￿2￿i
2￿i )Mi) for every i.
Assumption 2 implies that it is optimal to o⁄er qi = 0 or qi = x. (See Proposition
3 and Lemma 2 below.) This assumption reduces the problem￿ s dimension.
Assumption 3 implies that if an o⁄er is accepted, the value of the buyer￿ s assets
falls, and that it falls by less when the buyer o⁄ers a higher price (see Lemma 3).
(Observe that since ￿i = 1, xi < Mi and is consistent with Assumption 1 in the
single-period case.)
As before, it is assumed that initially the capital constraint is satis￿ed (that is,
Pn
i=1(1
2 + ￿i)Mi ￿ L), and that B is large enough so that satisfying the capital
constraint is ￿rst priority. We also make some parameter assumptions (details below)
that imply that the solution to the problem above (where the capital constraint must
hold only when trading ends) is identical to the solution to a problem in which the
capital constraint must hold after each round.
We solve the problem using dynamic programming. Denote by Vi(k) the highest
utility that the buyer can obtain if he can trade only with sellers i;i + 1;:::;n, and




0 if k ￿ L
￿B otherwise. (12)
The value function is
Vi(k) = max
(q;b)
￿(q;b) + (1 ￿ ￿)Evi[Vi+1(k
0 (k;q;b))] + ￿Evi[W(k
0 (k;q;b))], (13)
where Evi[￿] denotes expectation with respect to the random variable vi, and k0 is a




k + (￿i ￿ 1
2b)q ￿ 1
2(1 ￿ b)Mi if vi ￿ b
k + 1
2bMi if vi > b: (14)
(We regularly omit the arguments k, q, b.) The ￿rst line in (14) is the value of the
buyer￿ s assets in the next period if the seller accepts the o⁄er. The buyer obtains q
units of the asset, each unit worth ￿i + 1
2b to him, on average, but he also pays b per
unit, so the net change is q(￿i + 1
2b ￿ b). Adding new units of the asset also reduces
the value of existing inventories from (￿i + 1
2)Mi to (￿i + 1
2b)Mi, with a net change
of ￿1
2(1 ￿ b)Mi. The second line is the value of the buyer￿ s assets if the seller rejects
the o⁄er. A rejected o⁄er increases the value of existing inventories from (￿i + 1
2)Mi
to (￿i + 1
2 + 1
2b)Mi, with a net change of 1
2bMi.
Denote the argument inside the maximization problem in (13) by Vi(k;q;b); that
is, Vi(k) = max(q;b) Vi(k;q;b). Denote the optimal solution by (qi(k);bi(k))i=1;:::;n.
The initial value of the buyer￿ s assets is denoted by k0.
Lemma 2 1. Vi(k) increases (weakly) in k.
2. If qi(k) > 0, then ￿(qi;bi) ￿ 0 (or equivalently, bi ￿ 2￿i).
3. Either qi(k) = 0 or qi(k) = xi (i.e., with each seller the buyer o⁄ers to buy
everything or nothing.)
19Note that an o⁄er with q = 0 is equivalent to the o⁄er (q;b) = (x;0). Thus, from
now on we can assume without loss that all o⁄ers have q = x.
Denote ka ￿ k + (￿i ￿ 1
2b)q ￿ 1
2(1 ￿ b)Mi. This is the value of the buyer￿ s assets
given that an o⁄er is accepted. (Equation (14)).
Lemma 3 (i) If an o⁄er is accepted, the value of the buyer￿ s assets falls (i.e., ka < k).
(ii) The value of assets falls by less when the buyer o⁄ers a higher price (i.e., @ka
@b > 0).
The next lemma says that the capital constraint must hold at each point in time
(i.e., not only after the last round, but after any round).
Lemma 4 If k ￿ L, then either qi(k) = 0 (i.e., no o⁄er is made) or qi(k) > 0 and
bi(k) ￿
2(L￿k)+Mi￿2￿ixi
Mi￿xi . (In other words, b is chosen so that ka ￿ L.)
5.2 Two sellers
From now on we focus on the case n = 2, assuming that Mi = M, ￿i = ￿, xi = x
for i 2 f1;2g. Since the parameters in each round are the same, it is suboptimal to
delay o⁄ers. In other words, if it is suboptimal to make an o⁄er in the ￿rst round, it
is also suboptimal to make an o⁄er in the second round.
Denote the bidding strategy by (b;ba;br), where b denotes the o⁄er to the ￿rst
seller, and ba;br denote the o⁄er to the second seller given that the ￿rst seller accepted
or rejected, respectively. (From Lemma 2, all o⁄ers have qi = x.) Denote the optimal
bids by (b￿;b￿
a;b￿
r). It turns out that whenever the buyer￿ s ￿rst-period bid is rejected,
his capital constraint in the second period is su¢ ciently slack that he can make his
unconstrained optimal bid of ￿:
Lemma 5 If b￿ > 0, then b￿
r = ￿.
20Using Lemma 5, the problem reduces to ￿nding b and ba. From equation (14) and
Lemma 3, if the buyer o⁄ers b > 0 and the o⁄er is accepted, the value of his assets
becomes






(1 ￿ b)M] < k0.
If the buyer then o⁄ers ba > 0, the value of his assets becomes






(1 ￿ b)M] < ka.
Thus, if b;ba > 0, the relevant capital constraint is
kaa ￿ L, (15)
and if b > 0 but ba > 0, the relevant constraint is
ka ￿ L: (16)
Since k0 = 2M(1=2 + ￿), equation (15) reduces to
b + ba ￿ H, (17)
and equation (16) reduces to
b ￿ H ￿ ￿, (18)
where
H ￿








2(M￿x) > 2￿. The last inequality follows since ￿ < 1=2. Observe that,
everything else equal, an increase in H corresponds to an increase in L, the buyer￿ s
net liabilities.
The buyer￿ s expected utility reduces to xV (b;ba), where
V (b;ba) = ￿(b) + mb￿(ba) + m(1 ￿ b)￿(￿): (20)
21Since b;ba ￿ 2￿ (Lemma 2), trade can happen if and only if 2￿ ￿ H ￿ ￿, which
reduces to H ￿ 2￿ + ￿. If H ￿ 2￿, the benchmark solution is achieved (i.e.,
b = ba = ￿). The rest of this section deals with the case H 2 (2￿;2￿ + ￿]. We
assume, without loss, that if the buyer is indi⁄erent between bidding once or bidding
twice, he bids twice.
Proposition 4 There exists some H2 > 2￿ such that whenever H 2 (2￿;H2), the
buyer always bids in both periods. Moreover, he bids more than benchmark ￿ in the
￿rst period, and even more in the second period (i.e., b￿
a > b￿ > ￿).
Proposition 4 captures one aspect of dynamic behavior. If initial leverage is rel-
atively moderate, the buyer has enough slack in his capital constraint to make two
rounds of o⁄ers. But unless leverage is very low, the buyer still needs to consider
his capital constraint, and this leads him to bid more than the benchmark in both
periods. If his ￿rst bid is accepted, his capital constraint is tightened, forcing him to
bid even more in the second period. In other words, the price at which trade occurs
rises over time (conditioning on trade occurring in both periods).
If instead initial leverage is high, the buyer has insu¢ cient slack to have two bids
accepted:
Proposition 5 There exists some H1 < 4￿ such that whenever H 2 (H1;2￿ + ￿),
trade occurs in at most one period. Within this range, if H exceeds (is less than) ￿+￿
the ￿rst period bid is above (below) the benchmark bid ￿.
By Proposition 5, once leverage is high, there must be a period in which trade
does not occur. In particular, if the buyer￿ s ￿rst period o⁄er is accepted, his capital
constraint is too tight to make a bid in the second period; i.e., the market freezes.
22Proposition 5 also sheds light on the price path leading up to this market freeze.
When leverage is very high, the bid before the market freeze is also very high (more
than benchmark). In contrast, when leverage is only moderately high, the bid before
the market freeze is low. The reason for this last result is that, knowing he has just
one trade left, the buyer is tempted to submit a low bid in the ￿rst period: if the
bid is accepted, he has high pro￿ts, and if it is rejected, he still gets to make the
benchmark bid ￿ in period 2. However, he cannot bid too little for fear of violating
his capital constraint.
6 Summary
We analyze how existing stocks of assets ￿ inventories ￿ a⁄ect the volume and terms
of trade. Inventories can either increase or decrease the volume of trade, depending
on the leverage of the trading parties. As leverage increases from low to moderate to
high levels, prices and the probability of trade ￿rst increase, and then markets break
down completely.
We also show the following dynamic e⁄ect in a two-stage model: The buyer bids
aggressively in the ￿rst stage and purchases assets, which increases his inventory and
leverage. In the second stage, the buyer either bids even more aggressively, paying
higher prices for assets, generating more volume and further increasing his inventory
and leverage; or else he does not bid at all, i.e., trade breaks down. For some initial
levels of leverage, the buyer may reduce his bid in the ￿rst round and not bid at all
in the second round. This sequence of events matches the broad outlines of market
developments in recent years.
237 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider an o⁄er (q;b) with q 2 (0;x) and b ￿ ￿
1+￿q. If
￿(q;b) > 0, the buyer can increase his pro￿ts by o⁄ering (x;b). Since ￿ > 0, the
new o⁄er satis￿es (8). If ￿(q;b) < 0, the buyer is better o⁄ o⁄ering (0;b). Finally, if
￿(q;b) = 0, the buyer can increase his payo⁄ by o⁄ering (x;b ￿ "), where " 2 (0;b).
Reducing b increases the buyer￿ s payo⁄, and if " is small (and since ￿ > 0), it is
possible to increase q, so that equation (8) is satis￿ed. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:
If ￿ ￿ 1
2 (￿ ￿ ￿￿x + cx), the capital constraint does not bind and the buyer bids
(x;￿). The remainder of the proof deals with the case ￿ > 1
2 (￿ ￿ ￿￿x + cx).
First, note that the problem has a solution, as follows. For any q > 0, the buyer￿ s










, which is continuous in q. Thus,




. Since the objective is
continuous in q, a solution exists.
Let (q￿;b￿) denote the buyer￿ s optimal o⁄er. Given the assumption ￿x < 1, clearly
b￿ ￿ ￿ if q￿ > 0, since otherwise the buyer could strictly increase pro￿ts by increasing
b. Moreover, b￿ ￿ 2￿ since otherwise the buyer loses money.
Whenever q￿ > 0, the capital constraint must hold with equality: if instead it is
slack, either q￿ < x, in which case q can be increased, or q￿ = x and b￿ > ￿, in which
case b can be decreased.
The capital constraint reduces to b ￿ b(q), where b(q) =
2￿￿cq
1￿￿q . Observe that
b0(q) =
2￿￿￿c
(1￿￿q)2. In addition, ￿ 2 (0;1] implies that ￿ > 0.
If ￿ ￿ c
2￿, increasing q helps relax (weakly) the capital constraint. In this case, the
optimal quantity q￿ cannot lie in (0;x), as in Lemma 1. Thus, either (q;b) = (x;b(x)),
or q = 0.
24Moreover, since ￿ ￿ c
2￿ the bid (q;b) = (x;b(x)) generates positive pro￿ts, and
hence is preferred, as follows. We must show b(x) ￿ 2￿, or equivalently, ￿ ￿ 1
2cx +
￿(1 ￿ ￿x). So it su¢ ces to show c
2￿ ￿ 1
2cx + ￿(1 ￿ ￿x). This last inequality is
equivalent to ￿ ￿ 2￿￿




2￿￿￿ ￿ ￿, with strict inequality unless ￿ = ￿ = 1. Hence ￿ ￿ c
2￿
only if ￿ ￿ ￿.
If instead ￿ > c
2￿, increasing q makes the capital constraint tighter. In this case,
trade can happen if and only if b(0) < 2￿, which reduces to ￿ < ￿. The problem
becomes: Find q 2 [0;x] that maximizes f(q) = q￿(b(q)). We can add the constraint
b(q) ￿ ￿, without loss. Thus, we can maximize f(q) over the compact set [0;x] \ Q,
where Q ￿ fq : b(q) ￿ ￿g. Since f(q) is strictly concave over this set, there exists a
unique solution. To see why f is concave, note that
f











Since b(q) ￿ ￿, we know that ￿0(b(q)) ￿ 0. In addition, ￿00(b(q)) < 0, b0(q) > 0, and
since ￿ > 0, it follows that b00(q) > 0. Thus, f00(q) < 0.
If f0(x) ￿ 0, the solution is q￿ = x. Otherwise, we need to rule out the other
corner, f0(q￿) = 0, q￿ < x, and it follows from the implicit function theorem that
@q￿

























It remains to show that @b￿
@￿ > 0 when q < x. First, consider the case ￿b￿ ￿c ￿ 0.
Fix ~ ￿ > ￿, and let the associated optimal bid be
￿
~ b￿; ~ q￿
￿
. From above, ~ q￿ < q￿. But
then b￿ ￿ ~ q￿ (￿b￿ ￿ c) ￿ 2~ ￿ < b￿ ￿ q￿ (￿b￿ ￿ c) ￿ 2￿ = 0; i.e., the bid (b￿; ~ q￿) violates
the capital constraint. So ~ b￿ > b￿.
25Second, consider the case ￿b￿ ￿ c > 0. The buyer￿ s problem can be written as
maxb q (b)￿ (b), where q(b) = b￿2￿
￿b￿c is the value of q that sets the capital constraint
to equality for a given b. To show the result use the implicit function theorem.
Speci￿cally, let g(b) = q(b)￿(b); observe that q0(b) =
2￿￿￿c






















Proof of Lemma 2:
1. The proof is by backward induction. Since k0 and W(k) increase in k, it follows
that Vn(k) increases in k. Suppose the claim is true for Vi+1(k), and consider the





maximizing choice associated with this ￿ k. Consider any ~ k > ￿ k. Since k0, Vi+1 and





￿ ￿(￿ q;￿ b) + (1 ￿ ￿)Evi[Vi+1(k
0
￿





~ k; ￿ q;￿ b
￿
)]
￿ ￿(￿ q;￿ b) + (1 ￿ ￿)Evi[Vi+1(k
0 ￿￿ k; ￿ q;￿ b
￿
)] + ￿Evi[W(k






2. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose bi > 2￿i. Then ￿i(qi;bi) < 0 (from
benchmark case), and we can increase ￿i(qi;bi) by lowering qi. Lowering qi not only
makes ￿(qi;bi) less negative, but it also increases k0 with probability bi (note that if
bi > 2￿i, the coe¢ cient of qi in (14), ￿i ￿ 1
2bi, is negative) and keeps it unchanged
with probability 1 ￿ bi. Therefore, Vi+1(ki+1) and W(ki+1) increase (using part 1),
and overall, Vi(k) increases in contradiction to the optimality of qi(k).
263. If qi > 0, then bi ￿ 2￿i (from part 2), and ￿(qi;bi) ￿ 0. Increasing qi to xi, and
keeping bi unchanged, increases Vi(k). In particular, ￿(qi;bi) increases, as well as k0
and W(k0). From part 1 it follows that Vi+1(k0) increases. In addition, the transition
probabilities bi and 1 ￿ bi remain unchanged. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: The ￿rst part follows from the assumption xi < (
1￿2￿i
2￿i )Mi.
To see why, note that since bi ￿ 0, it follows that (￿i ￿ 1
2b)q ￿ ￿ixi, and from part
2 in Lemma 2 it follows that 1
2(1 ￿ b)Mi ￿ 1
2(1 ￿ 2￿i)Mi. Finally, note that the
assumption is equivalent to ￿ixi < 1
2(1 ￿ 2￿i)Mi. The second part follows from the
assumption q ￿ xi < Mi. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: We need to show that it is possible to choose B that
is high enough so that the claim is true. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose
bi(k) <
2(L￿k)+Mi￿2￿ixi
Mi￿xi . Let b be some number such that b 2 (0;￿). If bi ￿ b,
the loss from choosing bi(k) compared to choosing bi =
2(L￿k)+Mi￿2￿ixi
Mi￿xi is at least
bi(k)￿B ￿ b￿B. If ￿B is large enough the potential loss is larger than the expected
bene￿t. If bi < b, one can improve Vi(k) by choosing bi = ￿. The bene￿t is at least
￿(￿)￿￿(bi) ￿ 1
2￿2￿b(￿￿ 1
2b). The cost is that the o⁄er is less likely to be rejected,
so we are less likely to start the next period with higher wealth. An upper bound
on the cost is (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ b)[Vi+1(k + 1
2bM) ￿ Vi+1(k)] ￿ 1
2￿2 Pn
j=i+1(1 ￿ ￿)j (by
induction). If ￿ is large enough and/or b is small enough, the cost is less than the
bene￿t. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5:
Since choosing br = ￿ maximizes pro￿ts in the second round, it is enough to show
that the capital constraint is not violated after choosing br = ￿. From equation (14),
after the ￿rst o⁄er is rejected, the value of the buyer￿ s assets is k0+ 1
2Mb; if the buyer
subsequently o⁄ers br = ￿, and this o⁄er is accepted, the value of the buyer￿ s assets
27becomes
kra ￿ k0 +
1
2
























xb + (￿x ￿
1
2
M) ￿ L. (21)
Since M > x, equation (14) implies that kra ￿ L. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Assume H 2 (2￿;2￿ + ￿]: If the buyer wishes to make sure he can bid in the
second period even if his ￿rst period bid is rejected, his capital constraint binds (since
H > 2￿), and his expected pro￿t is
R2(H) = max
b2[￿;2￿]
￿(b) + mb￿(H ￿ b) + m(1 ￿ b)￿(￿).
If instead the buyer follows a strategy of bidding only once, his capital constraint may
or may not bind, and his expected pro￿t is
R1(H) = max
b2[￿;2￿] s.t. b￿H￿￿
￿(b) + m(1 ￿ b)￿(￿):
Both R1 and R2 are continuous. Observe that R2(2￿) > R1(2￿), and R2(4￿) <
R1(4￿). Hence, there exists some H2 > 2￿ such that R2(H) > R1(H) whenever
H < H2. For such values of H, the buyer chooses his ￿rst-period bid to make sure he
can bid in the second period even if his ￿rst-period bid is rejected.
To establish the claimed ordering of the bids, we need to show that the b that
maximizes V (b;H ￿ b) lies between ￿ and H
2 (so that b < H ￿ b). Note ￿rst that
V (b;H ￿ b) is a cubic in b, and the coe¢ cient on the cubic term is negative. In the
case under consideration, H > 2￿. Given this, the result follows if
d
db















V (b;H ￿ b) = ￿
0(b) + m￿(H ￿ b) ￿ mb￿
0(H ￿ b) ￿ m￿(￿):
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which is negative, since ￿0 (H=2) < 0, and 1 > mH
4 + m￿
2 , since m < 1 and H=4 <
￿ < 1=2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: The existence of H1 follows from the proof of Proposi-
tion 4. To ￿nd the bid in the ￿rst round, note that if ba = 0, the optimal b maximizes
V (b;0), subject to b ￿ H ￿ ￿. Observe that V (b;0) is quadratic. The unconstrained
solution is e b = ￿ ￿ 1
2m￿2. If e b ￿ H ￿ ￿, then b￿ = e b. Otherwise, we want to get as
close as possible to e b while still satisfying the constraint. Thus, b￿ = max(e b;H ￿ ￿).
Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: Probability of trade as a function of seller’s leverage, when the seller cares about 
the value of his inventory.  
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Figure 1a: Probability of trade as a function of the amount of assets that can be sold, when 
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Figure 1b: Probability of trade as a function of the gains from trade, when the seller cares 
about the value of his inventory. 